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I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 2017, the Alabama Senate voted to authorize the formation of a
new police department. Like other officers in the state, officers at the new
agency would have to be certified by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards
and Training Commission. These new officers would be “charged with all of
the duties and invested with all of the powers of law enforcement officers.”1
Unlike most officers in Alabama, though, the officers at the new agency
would not be city, county, or state employees. Instead, they would be working
for the Briarwood Presbyterian Church, which would be authorized under

*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to Geoff
Alpert, Colin Miller, and Nick Selby for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am thankful for the
research assistance of Emily Bogart, Ashlea Carver, Courtney Huether, and Colton Driver, and for the
editorial assistance provided by the American Journal of Criminal Law. As always, I am deeply grateful
for the support of Alisa Stoughton.
1
S.B. 193 (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/text/SB193/id/1522071.
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Senate Bill 193, to “appoint and employ one or more persons to act as police
officers to protect the safety and integrity of the church and its ministries.”2
The prospect of a private church with its own police department seems
like a radical departure from modern practices. The contemporary conception
of policing, after all, views it as a primarily and foundationally governmental
activity.3 That observation is easy to take for granted. After all, “maintaining
order and controlling crime are paradigmatic governmental functions.”4 That
is certainly the role that most police agencies see themselves as fulfilling, 5
and, by and large, that is also how the public sees policing. The uniformed
police officers that we see driving around; that we read about in the news; and
that we watch in reality shows like COPS, crime dramas like Law & Order,
and comedies like The Other Guys are, without exception, government
employees.6 This will strike most people as entirely unremarkable, and for
good reason. By any common conception, “the police are government
incarnate.”7 There is, and we expect there to be, law enforcement even when
the government does not provide or contract for basic services like water,
sanitation services, or roads.8 Indeed, policing is symbolized by the evocative
image of the Thin Blue Line, which represents the bulwark that defends
civilized society from criminal anarchy.Yet the perception of law
enforcement and crime-fighting as exclusively governmental activities is
inaccurate as both a historical matter and a modern description. Given the
historical, operational, and legal overlap between public and private policing,
the Thin Blue Line is neither particularly thin nor exclusively blue. This is
not a revelatory observation. Elizabeth Joh and David Sklansky, among
others, have written about private policing,9 and there is a substantial body of
literature about what is variously called “plural policing,” “joint policing,” or
“third-party policing.”10 Prior efforts, however, do not fully illustrate the
2

S.B. 193 (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/text/SB193/id/1522071.
U.S. PRIVATE SECURITY COUNCIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY: SOURCES AND
AREAS OF CONFLICT AND STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 (1977) (“The prevention and control
of crime has traditionally be viewed by many citizens as a function of government provided by public law
enforcement agencies.”).
4
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1999).
5
See Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 611 (2016) (discussing the law enforcement’s self-image as the “Thin Blue Line” that
separates society from chaos).
6
The equation of law enforcement with government is pervasive, so much so that fictional depictions
often use the police as a foil for private investigators who have a characteristically tense relationship with
law enforcement. Sherlock Holmes, Jack Reacher, Harry Dresden, and Paul Blart are defined in large part
by their engagement in law enforcement activities despite not being government agents.
7
David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 89 (2006).
8
This is not to suggest that every governmental entity and subdivision provides independent policing
services; that is certainly not the case. Many towns and cities contract with other jurisdictions, such as
neighboring cities or the surrounding county, to provide police services. In very remote areas, state police
or federal agents may be the only law enforcement officers operating in the jurisdiction.
9
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 89; Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 573, 596 (2005) [hereinafter Joh, Conceptualizing]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private
Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 55 (2004) [hereinafter Joh, Paradox]; Sklansky, supra note
4, at 1168.
10
See generally Hayden P. Smith & Geoffrey Alpert, Joint Policing: Third Parties and the Use of
Force, 12 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 136 (2011); MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING (2006);
PLURAL POLICING: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn eds., 2006); ADAM
CRAWFORD, PLURAL POLICING: THE MIXED ECONOMY OF VISIBLE PATROLS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
3
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distortions in the line that separates public and private policing. This Article
contributes to an on-going conversation about modern conceptions of
policing. Perhaps more importantly given the broad consensus that policing
is in need of reform, this article explores some of the ways in which the
blurred blue line should affect the way we think about police reform.11
Part I describes the evolution of modern policing, tracing the emergence
of the now-familiar police department from a mixed heritage of public and
private efforts. That evolution is not clearly linear; instead, American
policing grew out of the domestic adoption of English institutions such as
shire-reeves, constables, night watches, and thief-takers, as well as the
creation of domestic institutions like rural slave patrols and city guards
organized to prevent slave rebellions. These early institutions, a mix of
private and public entities, shared responsibility for a variety of different tasks
that today we categorize as central to law enforcement efforts.
Part II explores the modern practice of policing, illustrating the
operational overlap between public and private policing. Building on
Elizabeth Joh’s and David Sklansky’s work on private policing, and on my
own work on police moonlighting,12 it describes four different phenomena
that can blur the blue line: private policing, semi-public private policing,
semi-private public policing, and public policing.
Part III identifies how a broader appreciation of the blurred line of public
and private policing might affect police reform efforts. I first refute the
argument that the blurred blue line has no role in the reform debate. I then
identify three categories where the concept may prove relevant: information
gathering, the distribution of police resources, and the regulation of policing
itself. Within each category, I suggest how a broader conception of
policing—one that incorporates the spectrum of public and private
behaviors—could inform a range of important conversations. I offer no
specific prescriptions; my goal with this piece is not to provide a set of
solutions, but rather a set of possibilities.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POLICING
Just as the need for security and safety is nothing new, the police
function—deterring, identifying, and apprehending criminals—is hardly
innovative. The methods in which those functions are fulfilled, though, have
changed significantly over time. In the colonial era and the early days of the
United States, what we would today identify as the police function was not
fulfilled by governmental agencies. “[M]ost of the institutions historically
(2005); MARK BUTTON, PRIVATE POLICING (2002); Rick Sarre & Tim Prenzler, The Relationship Between
Police & Private Security: Models and Future Directions, 24 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 91
(2000) (providing examples from Australia); Michael E. Buerger, The Politics of Third-Party Policing, 9
CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 89 (1998) (discussing “the forced recruitment of agents . . . to act on behalf and
direction of the police to control human behavior”).
11
U.S. PRIVATE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 1 (“The prevention and control of crime has
traditionally be viewed by many citizens as a function of government provided by public law enforcement
agencies.”).
12
Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The Private Employment of Off-Duty Officers, (forthcoming
2017) (on file with University of Illinois Law Review).
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responsible for law enforcement would not be recognizable to us as police.”13
Indeed, “[t]he concept of a publicly funded entity designed to serve and
protect society is a relatively recent historical development.”14 In this Part, I
trace the predecessors of that development.
First, a clarification. Elizabeth Joh defines modern private policing as
“the various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel services whose
primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection of property and
life, and the maintenance of order.”15 She correctly observes early law
enforcement efforts, such as I will describe in this Part, “are not analogous to
the private, commercial companies offering policing services today, but are
better classified as examples of community obligations, volunteer efforts, and
vigilantism.”16 As a result, she warns, “one should be cautious in tracing a
continuous development of private policing from the earliest forms of
community self-protection to the present day.”17 I happily concede her point,
and I echo her warning. This article, though, is focused on the blurred line
between public and private policing. To that end, it is worthwhile to trace the
evolution of policing from earlier efforts, both public and private. As this Part
will demonstrate, public and private policing did not evolve separately. To
the contrary, from the earliest inception of modern policing it has been all but
impossible to draw clear distinctions between public and private—which is to
say, governmental and non-governmental—policing.
A. The Complicated Origins of Modern Policing
The government’s role in law enforcement is perhaps most identifiable in
the form of the early English shire-reeve, a title that gives us the modern word
“sheriff.” The shire-reeve was a monarchical officer, selected by and
answerable to the monarch.18 Shire-reeves were principally tax-collectors,19
although they had the authority to assemble a group of men known as a posse
comitatus—literally “the power of the county”20—when needed to keep the
peace or apprehend a felon. The shire-reeves received a portion of the taxes
they collected as pay, creating a perverse incentive. As a result, “many
[reeves] exploited the power their position gave them for their own financial
gain.”21 The existing legal system “predictably “led to abuses and made
[reeves] rather unpopular figures.”22 The low regard in which they were held
is observable at least as early as the 1400s in the form of Robin Hood’s
nemesis, the corrupt and oppressive Sheriff of Nottingham (or, differently
titled, the Reeve of Nottinghamshire).
13

KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 27 (2007).
JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN AMERICA 33 (2003).
15
Joh, Paradox, supra note 9, at 55.
16
Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 579–80.
17
Id. at 585.
18
PASTOR, supra note 14, at 35.
19
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 31.
20
Id.; ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR: AND RATIONAL PROPOSALS TO TURN THE TIDE
163 (2005).
21
See generally ELIZABETH M. HALLAM, THE PLANTAGENET CHRONICLES (1995).
22
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 31.
14
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Although the shire-reeve was the clearest example of a governmental
agent, perhaps the most recognizable precursor of the modern law
enforcement agency was the night watch system that originated in cities and
larger towns in the mid-1200s.23 Every able-bodied, adult male was required
to participate in the watch, charged with taking the occasional shift patrolling
the town or city at night and sounding an alarm when necessary.24 There was
no compensation, direct supervisor, or clearly identified duties. Though
initially a symbol of distinction, working as a watchman eventually became
something of “a public joke”; participation may have been a public duty, but
it was one that was often fulfilled through private transactions as citizens hired
substitutes if they had the financial means to do so.25 “By the seventeenth
century only those who could not hire a substitute actually assumed [the]
onerous duties. Once started, this practice introduced to police work those
who were less and less qualified to do the work.”26 As a result, night
watchmen were “unarmed, untrained, under-supervised, often unwilling, and
frequently drunk.”27
In England, local jurisdictions in and around London began paying
watchmen in 1735, and most were doing so by 1785.28 At the same time, the
watch system became more formalized, developing minimum qualifications,
a command structure, and record-keeping requirements.29 Even then,
“‘although [the watch] function was certainly specialized, it is not always
clear that it was policing. Very often, [watchmen] acted only as sentinels,
responsible for summoning others to apprehend criminals, repel attack, or put
out fires.’”30
The watch system may be the clearest predecessor to modern policing,
but even in its time it did not operate alone. In 1797, thefts of cargo from
boats on the Thames led a small group of distinguished citizens, including
celebrated jurist Jeremy Bentham, to approach the West India Planters
Committee and the West India Merchants Committees associations with a
proposal to create a private police force.31 With the permission of the
government, the Thames Police—officially the West India Merchants
Company Marine Police Institute—began operations the next year.32
Parliament passed the appropriately titled Act for the More Effectual
Prevention of Depredations on the River Thames to support England’s first

23

Id.
Id.
25
DAVID R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY 3 (1981).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 31–32; see also PASTOR, supra note 14, at 36 (describing watchmen as “ill-trained, illequipped groups of men [who] often lost control and violated laws and created violence in the quest to
institute ‘law and order’”).
28
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 32.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 27 (quoting David H. Bayley, The Development of Modern Policing, in POLICING
PERSPECTIVES, AN ANTHOLOGY 67 (Larry K Gaines & Gary W. Cordner eds., 199[8])).
31
19 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: NOW FIRST COLLECTED 330–34 (John Bowring ed.,
Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., London; John Cumming, Dublin, 1843).
32
Dick
Paterson,
Origins
of
Thames
Police,
THAMES POLICE MUSEUM,
http://www.thamespolicemuseum.org.uk/h_police_1.html (last visited June 27, 2017).
24
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preventative police force.33 The Thames Police did not last long, but it
sparked a broader interest in private efforts to supplement the watch system.
“‘By 1829[,] London had become a patchwork of public and private police
forces.”34 A contemporary record reflects private police units operating in
forty-five different parishes within ten miles of London.35
It could be difficult to distinguish the public police from private
watchmen, a confusion engendered by the widespread practice of fee-based
policing. According to one scholar, a police officer’s public salary could be
more properly described as “a retaining fee”; officers’ primary income was
claiming or sharing “any rewards for the detection and conviction of
offenders, [whether] offered by statute, proclamation or by a private party.”36
Supplementing into that patchwork were thief-takers—individuals who
would, for a fee, recover stolen property, which they often obtained by buying
it from the thief with a portion of the recovery fee37—and “felons
associations” that raised money to fund prosecutions related to crimes
committed within the association’s purview and which occasionally hired
private patrols.38
B. Policing in Colonial America
As in England, a complicated patchwork dominated colonial America.
Elected sheriffs and constables were the face of public law enforcement, but
neither was particularly attractive. “Corruption . . . was quite common, with
sheriffs accepting bribes from suspects and prisoners, neglecting their civil
duties, tampering with elections, and embezzling public funds.”39 Constables
“were paid by a system of fees, and [they] tended to concentrate on the betterpaying tasks.”40 As a result, neither position was viewed as particularly
respectable. “[M]any people refused to serve when elected, and the authority
of each office was commonly challenged, sometimes by violence.”41
According to one text, “By the 1650s[,] Bostonians had become so adept at
avoiding service that the colony’s government had to threaten citizens with
huge fines to make them assume their obligations.”42 Citizens’ adeptness in
dodging their obligations proved persistent. Almost a century later, in 1743,
seventeen Bostonians were selected to serve as constables, but only five
entered service; ten men refused and paid a fine, while two others were
33

39 & 40 Geo 3 c 87.
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 32 (quoting Bayley, supra note 30, at 63).
35
Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 584.
36
Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Trading in Police Services: An Aspect of the Early 19th Century Police in
England, 102 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1953). The author goes on to describe how officers’ remuneration
included “ordinary fees” and “fees for special services, zeal and exertion.” Id. at 8, 11. Additionally,
officers sought gratuities and took private assignments from individual civilians or companies. Id. at 18,
20, 22.
37
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 32.
38
Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 582.
39
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 33.
40
Id. at 33–34.
41
Id. at 34.
42
JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 5. By the mid-1700s, “many of those chosen [to serve as a watchman
or constable] preferred to pay fines rather than suffer the duties of the office.” Id. at 7.
34
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excused from service.43 Even the most conscientious sheriffs and constables
were not engaged in what modern viewers would consider to be primarily law
enforcement activity; their duties included serving warrants that had been
issued by a court, but also tax collection, supervising elections, organizing
road repair crews, and other civil functions.44
Like their English counterparts, many large towns and cities in the
colonial era and early United States, particularly in the northern colonies and
states, adopted a night watch system that conscripted able-bodied, adult men
to keep order, watch out for fires, light street lamps, and, in Boston at least,
“cry the time of night and state of the weather.”45 And as had been the case
in England, the watchmen were typically not paid and had no training, no set
procedure, little to no equipment, and no real command structure.46 Citizens
who could afford it hired substitutes to serve on the watch for them, ensuring
that the watch was dominated by those who had no way to avoid it or no better
opportunities elsewhere. These semi-privatized public officials—working
class citizens who were hired to satisfy the public service obligations of the
more affluent—did not burnish the image of the watch; a contemporary New
York City newspaper described them as “a parcel of idle, drinking, vigilant
Snorers, who never quelled any nocturnal Tumult in their Lives.”47 If
anything, this poor public perception only further ensured that those who had
the opportunity to avoid watch service did exactly that.
Although their duties overlapped to some extent, and although those
duties included some aspects of modern policing, neither sheriffs, constables,
nor the early American watch system could be clearly identified as the
primary provider of law enforcement services.48 A description of policing in
New York City in the mid-1780s identifies a small host of different public
officials who all shared some law enforcement responsibilities: the mayor and
his chief assistant, the high constable; constables and marshals who worked
primarily on commission; and watchmen who were paid (at the time) per night
of work.49
In the American South, an economy heavily dependent on slavery gave
rise to a different set of institutions that shared some of the responsibility for
policing functions. In the early colonial period, overseers were responsible
for controlling the slave populations on their plantations.50 Off the
plantations, private slave catchers and ad hoc militias hunted down runaway
43

JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1974).
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 33–34.
45
Id. at 34–35; WILLIAM J. BOPP & DONALD O. SCHULTZ, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 18 (1972).
46
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 35. There were limited exceptions; for example, the Boston night
watch began paying night watchmen in the early 1700s, although there is some dispute as to exactly when.
BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 18 (reporting that Boston’s night watchmen first received
compensation in 1712); A Brief History of the Boston, MA Police Department, BOSTON POLICE MUSEUM,
http://bostonpolicemuseum.com/history.html (last visited June 27, 2017) [hereinafter BPD Museum]
(putting the date at 1707).
47
ROBERT C. WADMAN & WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: A HISTORY OF
POLICE IN AMERICA 11 (2003).
48
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 35.
49
BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 26–27.
50
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 36.
44
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slaves, returning them for a fee.51 In 1661, the first slave code shifted
responsibility from private slave owners to the public—meaning the white
population—leading to the creation of more formalized militias. These
militias “began making regular patrols to catch runaways, prevent slave
gatherings, search slave quarters, keep order at markets, funerals, and
festivals, and generally intimidate the black population.”52 As with the
sheriffs, constables, and watch, the militias were assisted by private
individuals. In the late 1600s, whites were first authorized and then legally
required to assist in the recovery of runaway slaves, with the captors entitled
to a reward.53 In the early 1700s, under the threat of a Spanish invasion, South
Carolina bifurcated the duties of the militias and patrols: militias were
responsible for dealing with external threats, while patrols focused on
preventing slave revolts and dealing with runaways.54 Other southern
governments followed suit, and slave patrols became common.55
Although the slave patrols appear to be public entities, the reality is more
complex. Slave owners were averse to outside intervention, including
government intervention intended to reinforce owners’ control over their
slaves. Such intervention “represented not only a usurpation of [a slave
owner’s] authority but also a personal slight, implying that the master was not
up to the task of controlling his slaves.”56 Different jurisdictions sought to
address this aversion in different ways. Some rural slave patrols were paid
from public coffers, others were made up of volunteers, while others consisted
of unpaid conscripts.57 Regardless of their exact organization, their duties
were largely similar—prevent insurrection by intimidating the black
population—and they were given wide discretion to determine whether and
how to carry out those duties in any given situation.58
Southern anxieties about slave revolt were not limited to rural plantations.
Early on, cities and towns’ “enforcement [was] entrusted to private
individuals and the existing watch,” but soon the model of the rural slave
patrol was adopted in the form of city guards.59 Unlike the night watches that
they supplanted, the city guards were armed and uniformed from early on,
with Charleston, South Carolina establishing what may be the nation’s first
uniformed patrol in 1783.60 Such efforts took considerable public resources.
By the early 1800s, the single largest item in Charleston’s city budget was
funding for the slave patrol.61 These organized, uniformed, patrol-based
entities came into existence more than thirty years before anything we would
recognize today as modern police agencies.
51

Id.
Id. at 37.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 37–39.
56
Id. at 38.
57
Id. at 40–41.
58
Id. at 40–41.
59
Id. at 41–42.
60
Savannah, Georgia, followed suit in in 1796, with Richmond, Virginia, adopting uniforms in 1800.
Id. at 42.
61
RICHARDSON, supra note 43, at 19.
52
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C. The Emergence of Modern Policing
The first “modern” municipal police departments began to appear in the
1830s,62 largely in response to rioting and civil unrest.63 One of the first
metropolitan police departments in the country was funded not from the
public coffers but by the bequest of a wealthy philanthropist who wanted
“Philadelphia to provide more effectually than they do now for the security
and property of the persons . . . by a competent police.”64 As that phrasing
suggests, the police forces of the time were not universally admired. Indeed,
the concept of a public police force was attacked on both fiscal and
philosophical grounds. Fiscally, a publically funded police force would be
more expensive than a sheriff, who worked on commission, or night
watchmen, who were still often conscripted. Philosophically, the creation of
a full-time, paid police force would give a substantial amount of authority to
the government, raising concerns about excessive power and the invasion of
personal liberties.65 Despite these concerns, early police forces began to
supplement, then supplant, the watch systems.66
As American policing became more formalized, police agencies
somewhat reluctantly added detective bureaus. The reluctance stemmed from
the fact that the detectives’ “specialized function carried with it the imperative
to become involved with criminals,” and that involvement threatened to
undermine the legitimacy of the agency’s primary duty: patrol.67 Such
concern was well-founded. Ostensibly charged with solving crimes,
particularly property crimes, in practice “[t]he primary goal of the detective
was to recover stolen property and share in the reward, not to arrest the
thief.”68 In this way, detectives in early American policing were similar to
their English counterparts, the thief-takers; through a system for the recovery
of stolen property known as “compromises,” detectives “negotiated with
thieves and offered immunity for the return of property. The victim would
pay the detective a ‘reward,’ which the detective would share with the thief.”69
Many detectives worked on their own behalf or for a private security company
in addition to their work for their public employer.70 Even when they were
62
Exactly which city first created a municipal police department remains contested. Many police
agencies date their origins on the development of a day-time watch service. For example, Philadelphia is
often cited as the first police agency in the United States because it created a paid, day-time watch in 1833,
despite abandoning the effort three years later. CHARLES R. SWANSON ET AL., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
3 (2003). Similarly, the Boston Police Department is typically dated to 1838, when the city organized its
day watch even though it had started paying night watchmen more than a century before. BPD Museum,
supra note 46. New York City, for its part, began paying watchmen in 1658, shortly before the British
took it, under the name of Nieu Amsterdam, from the Dutch. BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 18–19.
63
RICHARDSON, supra note 43, at 21.
64
BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 35.
65
PASTOR, supra note 14, at 36.
66
In many cases, police forces proved to be significantly more effective than night watch systems.
In the 1840s, for example, the twenty-two person Boston police force “captured more criminals than the
entire rival body of over two hundred night watchmen.” BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 37.
67
GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 24 (1988).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 28 (describing how the “line between the public and private sectors was blurred as detectives
went back and forth, sometimes working for both [private and public employers] simultaneously”).
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working under the auspices of a public police agency, “much of policing took
on the character of a contractual relationship negotiated between clients (or
victims). The clients sought protective, investigative or enforcement services,
while the agents (i.e., police) supplied such services in return for a fee, reward
or share of recovered goods.”71
By the 1850s, police agencies were a common fixture of large cities,
although the officers themselves were not readily identifiable: they did not
typically wear uniforms.72 But despite the rise of the police department in its
modern incarnation, it would be a mistake to think that law enforcement was
exclusively or even primarily a governmental responsibility. Municipal
police agencies with limited jurisdiction were simply unable to accommodate
large-scale commercial entities operating on an interstate or national scale,
such as railroads, banks, and mining companies.73 This was particularly true
in the West and Midwest, which had relatively few public police officers.74
Without a strong federal police presence, private organizations stepped in to
fill the gap. In 1850, as localities across the country continued to establish
their own police agencies, Allan Pinkerton formed the Pinkerton National
Detective Agency.75 Pinkerton agents engaged in sting operations, solved
crimes, and hunted down criminals,76 all of which are likely to strike the
modern reader as more within the purview of public police than private
security.77
By the 1880s, all of the major cities in the United States had created
municipal police agencies, and states soon followed suit. Following Texas’s
early 1870 example, other southwestern states began creating state police
agencies at the turn of the century.78 State police continued to expand over
the next few decades, with the momentum eventually shifting from general
service police agencies to dedicated highway patrols during the Great
Depression.79 Throughout this period, private security was in decline as states
and local governments increased their expenditures on law enforcement,
71

PASTOR, supra note 14, at 37.
BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 39. There was both public and internal controversy about
police uniforms. Public critics condemned uniforms as imitative of royal livery, while many officers feared
that wearing a uniform would only invite attack. Id. at 39–40 (describing the sentiment among officers
“that the job was dangerous enough without advertising that one was an officer”); see also JOHNSON, supra
note 25, at 25. The officers may have had a point. In in 1700s, watchmen in Charleston, South Carolina,
had become so reviled that sailors “began to purposefully target the watchmen on their rounds, sometimes
beating them severely.” WADMAN & ALLISON, supra note 47, at 12. As a result, it took decades before
uniforms were accepted. Three of the largest police agencies—Boston, New York, and Chicago—adopted
uniforms in 1858, 1860, and 1861, respectively. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 29.
Notably, officers began carrying firearms as a matter of course at about the same time, although many
police agencies still prohibited them as a matter of official policy. Id. at 30. When cities began to authorize
officers to carry firearms, it “only recognized what was becoming standard.” Id.
73
PASTOR, supra note 14, at 38.
74
Id.
75
Id. Although the Pinkerton National Detective Agency was not the first private security company
in the United States, it was by far the largest and most successful. SWANSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 4.
76
MARX, supra note 67, at 28–29.
77
Then, as now, the proper balance of public and private policing was a matter of debate, with private
security forces criticized as tools of the wealthy. PASTOR, supra note 14, at 38–39.
78
H. KENNETH BECHTEL, STATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
35–39 (1995).
79
Id. at 42–44.
72
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encouraged by private industry and large companies that preferred to shift the
costs of security from their account books to the public coffers.80 The decline
of private policing, however, was temporary. The next Part addresses the
contemporary practices that continue to blur the line between public and
private policing.
III. THE BLURRING OF THE BLUE LINE
The prior Part described the complicated and inconsistent evolution of
public and private efforts that gave rise to modern policing, demonstrating
both the muddled heritage and the fact that there has likely never been a point
in time at which public and private policing could be clearly distinguished.
As leading scholars have pointed out, private policing efforts are difficult to
casually conceptualize. David Sklansky, for example, has argued that private
policing is functionally indistinguishable from both the public police and from
the public more generally.81 Elizabeth Joh has argued that “traditional legal
scholarship has demonstrated too shallow an understanding of private
policing in action,” which she attributes to the assumption “that private
policing is a monolithic entity.”82 Building on Elizabeth Joh’s and David
Sklansky’s work on private policing, this Part turns to the modern era by
describing four different phenomena: private policing, semi-public private
policing, semi-private public policing, and public policing.83 Each, it seems,
has the potential, if not the tendency, to blur the line that separates—or
doesn’t—public and private policing.
My objective in this Part is to demonstrate the substantial overlap that
exists in private and public policing as they are currently practiced. In so
doing, I do not mean to suggest that any interstices between the two are
inconsequential, nor do I intend to argue that the points of comparison are
universally applicable. Indeed, my goal is to offer some support for
Sklansky’s argument: as it is practiced, public and private policing can come
close to being functionally indistinguishable.84 Indeed, the line is blurred in
both directions to an extent that has not been fully appreciated. In the next
Part, I address the potential implications of that observation on police reform
efforts.
A. Private Policing
Today, the vast majority of police officers are employed at the state and
local level. According to the most recent data available, more than 15,000
state and local general-purpose law enforcement agencies employ almost
80

PASTOR, supra note 14, at 39.
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1270–75.
Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 596.
83
Elizabeth Joh has persuasively argued that it is a mistake to view private policing as monolithic, as
there are at least five dimensions of variation in (goals, resources, legal powers, jurisdiction, and
organizational location) and four distinct types of private policing (protective policing, intelligence
policing, publically contracted policing, and corporate policing). Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at
596. This valuable taxonomy informs, but cannot structure, my analysis here.
84
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1270–75.
81
82
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725,000 full-time officers.85 Additionally, more than 1,700 special
jurisdiction agencies—agencies with either a special geographic jurisdiction,
such as a university or public transportation system, or with limited
enforcement responsibilities such as alcohol control agencies—employ an
additional 57,000 full-time officers.86 The 638 constables and marshals’
agencies left in the country employ a total of about 3,500 full-time officers.87
In total, there are approximately 780,000 full-time, sworn law enforcement
officers working for state or local governments in the United States. The ratio
of 252 officers per 100,000 people means that there is one state or local officer
for roughly every 400 people (one officer for every 300 adults) in the
population.88
What about the private security industry? Although precise numbers are
difficult to come by,89 one thing is certain: there are more—probably many
more—individuals working in private security than in public policing.90 As
of 2015, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that there were almost 1.1
million private security guards responsible for “guard[ing], patrol[ing] or
monitor[ing] premises.”91 The National Association of Security Companies
agrees, estimating that, in 2006, “between 11,000 and 15,000 private security
companies employ[ed] more than 1 million guards.”92 The broader private
security industry, which includes individuals who conduct background
investigations, provide armored transport services, offer personal protection,
manage correctional facilities, and perform security-related tasks other than
those that fall under the general classification of “patrol,” is even larger.93
85
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., NCJ 233982, CENSUS OF
STATE
AND
LOCAL
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES,
2008,
at
2
(2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE & SEX COMPOSITION: 2010,
at 2 tbl.1 (May 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf. (There are an
additional 120,000 full-time law enforcement officers employed by the federal government, spread over
73 different law enforcement agencies. Of that number, over a third (37.3%) engage in “criminal
investigation and enforcement duties,” while almost a quarter (23.4%) perform police response and patrol.
The remainder works in immigration or customs inspection (15.3%), corrections (14.2%), security and
protection (5.1%), and court operations (4.7%).) REAVES, supra note 85, at 1. (Including federal officers,
there are 900,000 full-time, sworn officers in the United States, or one officer for about every 300 adults
in the population.)
89
This is true in part because there is no uniform definition about what constitutes “private security.”
For a useful discussion of the conceptual difficulties that complicate attempts to define that term, see
Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications, 3 CRIME
& JUST. 193, 195–98 (1981).
90
Joh, supra note 9, at 1; Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1175.
91
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND
WAGES: 33-9032 SECURITY GUARDS (May 2015), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes339032.htm;
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: SECURITY
GUARDS AND GAMING SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS (2016–17 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protectiveservice/security-guards.htm.
92
KEVIN STROM ET AL., DOCUMENT NO. 232781, THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF
THE DEFINITIONS, AVAILABLE DATA SOURCES, AND PATHS MOVING FORWARD 4-8 (Dec. 2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/
grants/232781.pdf.
93
STROM ET AL., supra note 92, at 4-6. One study estimates the number of “full-time security workers
to be between 1.9 and 2.1 million.” Press Release, ASIS Int’l, Groundbreaking Study Finds U.S. Security
Industry to be $350 Billion Market (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.asisonline.org/News/Press-Room/PressReleases/2013/Pages/Groundbreaking-Study-Finds-U.S.-Security-Industry-to-be-$350-Billion-
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Further, private security as an industry is growing faster than public policing.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that the ten-year period from 2014 to
2024 will see 4% growth in public policing, but 7% growth in the private
security industry.94 This follows ten-year predictions from 2012 to 2022 of
5% and 12%, respectively.95 Historically, the thirty-year period from 1980 to
2010 saw an 80% growth in contract security firms.96 Local police
departments, on the other hand, saw only a 34% increase in officers in the
twenty-six years between 1987 and 2013.97 Further, the total number and rate
of growth does not include individuals who work in a primarily security
capacity for non-security businesses, such as loss prevention employees
working for retail stores, or the wide range of employees who have some
security-related responsibilities, even if their primary duties are unrelated to
security.98
Regardless of whether they are employed by a traditional security
company or some other enterprise, private employees conduct a range of what
we would otherwise identify as law enforcement activities. The comparison
can be a point of pride for security personnel and a selling point for their
employers. Elizabeth Joh’s seminal article on the private security industry
opens with a quote from a security guard describing his agency as “very
policelike.”99 That description captures the broad involvement of private
security personnel in patrol, investigations, and surveillance, as well as their
authority to stop, search, and arrest. Uniformed security guards engage in
patrol on behalf of private businesses, community centers, and
neighborhoods. In many gated communities, security guards physically
control space100 by screening vehicles and pedestrians at entry checkpoints

Market.aspx [hereinafter Groundbreaking Study]. I have intentionally left unmentioned the private
security industry’s “hardware security” component, which manufactures, installs, and monitors alarm
systems. Although closely related to law enforcement, this function may be seen as distinct from the
modern conception of policing. There are some potential parallels, though: law enforcement agencies have
been instrumental in installing and monitoring emergency call boxes in some public spaces; these alarms
are a familiar sight on many university campuses.
94
Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK, POLICE AND DETECTIVES (2016–17 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/policeand-detectives.htm#tab-6 (visited Feb. 21, 2017), with id., SECURITY GUARDS & GAMING SURVEILLANCE
OFFICERS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/security-guards.htm#tab-6 (last visited June 27,
2017). Different facets of the private security industry may grow even faster. A study by ASIS Int’l, a
professional organization for the security industry, and the Institute of Finance and Management, a
professional organization for financial controllers, estimated that private investigations would see 21%
growth and information technology security would see 22% through 2020. Groundbreaking Study, supra
note 93.
95
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK,
POLICE AND DETECTIVES (2014–15 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-anddetectives.htm (Dec. 19, 2013); id., SECURITY GUARDS & GAMING SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/security-guards.htm.
96
STROM ET AL., supra note 92, at 4-3.
97
REAVES, supra note 85, at 1.
98
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1175 (listing “store clerks, insurance adjustors, and amusement park
attendants” as non-security employees who nevertheless have some security-related responsibilities).
99
Joh, Paradox, supra note 9, at 49 (quoting Bud Hazelkorn, Making Crime Pay, S.F. CHRON. MAG.,
Aug. 17, 2003, at 14, 17).
100
Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2199 (2014)
(“Policing is, to a significant extent, the exercise of control over space.”); see also STEVE HERBERT,
POLICING SPACE: TERRITORIALITY AND THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–11, 21–23 (1997).
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that only residents and duly designated guests are permitted to pass.101 They
respond to complaints and alarms, from the mall security officers called to
deal with an obnoxious patron in the food court to mobile security officers
who respond to residential burglar alarms. With both a preventative and
responsive aspect, private security patrol closely parallels the public police
patrol function.
Patrol is the “mainstay of police work,”102 but policing also includes an
investigative component; police agencies are expected to investigate and
solve crimes so they can apprehend offenders and support successful
prosecutions.103 Those investigations may include surveillance, either
targeted surveillance that tracks a subject suspected of wrong-doing104 or
drag-net surveillance that captures a range of individuals in an attempt to
ferret out wrong-doing that has not yet been identified.105 Just as private
parties parallel the public police’s patrol function, so too do they engage in
similar investigative behaviors. “Private detectives increasingly are hired not
only to watch for shoplifters, but also to investigate and not infrequently to
spy on, everyone from insurance claimants and litigation opponents to
employees, business partners, and even prospective neighbors.”106
In addition to targeted surveillance, private security efforts include
pervasive surveillance of public or private space. Such surveillance is not
intended to gather information about a particular person, but rather to observe
the behaviors of a group of people (whoever happens to be in camera range)
so that wrongdoers can be identified in real time or after the fact. Casino
surveillance is perhaps the most obvious example of privately administered
pervasive surveillance. In Nevada, for example, the Gaming Commission
requires licensed casinos that operate at least three gaming tables to have the
capacity to “monitor and record: (a) each table game area with sufficient
clarity to identify patrons and dealers; and (b) each table game surface, with
sufficient coverage and clarity to simultaneously view the table bank and
determine the configuration of wagers, card values, and game outcomes.”107
According to a long-time casino security engineer, a large casino like the
101
EDWARD JAMES BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (1997) (estimating that over 20,000 gated communities existed in the United

States as of 1997).
102
ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT 17 (2008); see also Seth
W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 879–80 (2014).
103
Indeed, this expectation is so persistent that the failure to do so is considered newsworthy. Martin
Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of Murders In America Go Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04
AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-in-america-gounresolved; Jace Larson, New Harris County Numbers Show Many Unsolved Crimes, CLICK2HOUSTON
(May 18, 2015), http://www.click2houston.com/news/investigates/new-harris-county-numbers-showmany-unsolved-crimes/33082726; Lyndsay Winkley, Murders Mostly Solved, Not Minor Crimes, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr. 11, 2015, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/apr/11/police-clearance-ratesmurders-fbi-stats/.
104
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
105
For example, the New York Police Department’s surreptitious surveillance of Muslim
communities in New Jersey. Adam Goldman, Tape Surfaces of Caller Outing NYPD Spying in NJ, ABC
EYEWITNESS NEWS 11 (July 25, 2012), http://abc11.com/archive/8748471/.
106
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1176.
107
NEVADA GAMING COMM’N, SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS FOR NONRESTRICTED LICENSES,
SURVEILLANCE
STANDARD
2(1)
(2005),
http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=2944.
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Bellagio may have more than 2,000 active cameras.108 While this is a rather
extreme example, and one largely directed at private space, private
surveillance in more public areas is a fact of modern life: outward facing
security cameras are a common feature of parking lots, gas pumps, ATMs,
apartment building entrances, urban storefronts, and so on.
Not only do private actors share many of the duties of their public
counterparts, they often share some of the same legal powers. At common
law, private citizens had the power to arrest—the proverbial “citizen’s
arrest”—but it was limited. Like public officials, private citizens could arrest
for felonies committed outside of their presence, but could only arrest for
misdemeanors and breaches of the peace committed in their presence.109 If
the person arrested for the misdemeanor was not the perpetrator of the crime,
or if no felony had actually been committed, a public officer was immune
from civil and criminal liability so long as they had a good faith belief
amounting to probable cause at the time of the arrest. But a private citizen
had no such protection; even with a good-faith, probable cause belief that the
perpetrator committed a crime, civilians remained potentially liable for a
range of intentional torts and their criminal analogues.110 Private security
guards, on the other hand, have less to worry about.
The law in many jurisdictions gives more flexibility to private businesses
and their employees than it does to citizens. Statutes that codify the commonlaw doctrine known as “shopkeeper’s privilege” or “merchant’s privilege,”
for example, provide a probable cause defense for business owners and
employees who arrest someone for larceny.111 Further, merchants may be
explicitly authorized to use force to effectuate the arrest or protect their
property in a way that private citizens are not.112 Such statutes may provide
“absolute immunity from civil liability for intentional torts . . . which may
occur during the apprehension and detention of a customer suspected for
shoplifting.”113 And while a merchant and the merchant’s agents face less
civil or criminal liability than a private individual would, the perpetrator of
the crime may face more; in some states, resisting a merchant or private
security guard’s attempt to arrest carries a separate criminal penalty in much
the same way that it is a crime to resist a police officer’s attempt to arrest.114
108
Jon Brodkin, Casino Insider Tells (Almost) all About Security, NETWORKWORLD (Mar. 7, 2008,
12:00
AM),
http://www.networkworld.com/
article/2284208/software/casino-insider-tells--almost--all-about-security.html.
109
Note, The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 502, 504–05 (1965) [hereinafter Citizen’s
Arrest]; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1924).
110
Citizen’s Arrest, supra note 109, at 511. Some states have provided substantive protections by
immunizing private citizens who have some quantum of proof—probable cause or reasonable cause are
the two most common—supporting their actions. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE
SERV. (NCJRS), NCJRS 146908, SCOPE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL apps.
C1
&
C2
(1976)
[hereinafter
NCJRS,
SCOPE
OF
LEGAL
AUTHORITY],
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146908NCJR
S.pdf.
111
Amanda G. Main, Note, Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theories of
Recovery and Relief, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 293–94 (2000).
112
Id. at 295.
113
ALAN KAMINSKY, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO PREMISES SECURITY LITIGATION 82 (2008).
114
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.015(6) (“An individual who . . . resists the reasonable effort of
a . . . merchant [or] merchant’s employee . . . commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.”).
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Private security guards acting on behalf of their employers are not just
given more protection than private citizens, they may also be given more
authority. In some states, private security guards are explicitly equated to
public police. In South Carolina, for example, an individual “hired or
employed to provide security services on a specific property is granted the
authority and arrest power given to sheriff’s deputies” while on that property,
so long as the security guard is “registered or licensed.”115 Further blurring
the line between public and private policing, it is the South Carolina State
Law Enforcement Division that does the registering and licensing for security
guards in the state, as well as playing a central role in the regulation of private
security and investigations businesses and employees.116
The equation of private actors with public officials also plays prominently
in the history of bounty hunting. The authority for bounty hunting dates from
1873, when the Supreme Court held that, under the common law, a bondsman
has “dominion” over a defendant whose bond he had paid.117 That control,
the Court held, “is a continuance of the original imprisonment.”118 By virtue
of the private contract, the private bondsman, in essence, stands in the shoes
of the public law enforcement official who had originally imprisoned the
defendant:
Whenever [the bondsmen] choose to do so, they may seize [the
defendant] and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that cannot
be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. They
may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him
into another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary,
may break and enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not
made by virtue of new process. None is needed. It is likened to the
rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.119
Given that authority, it should be no surprise that private parties engage
in the rather specialized function of fugitive apprehension. According to one
source, private “[b]ounty hunters claim to catch 31,500 bail jumpers per year,
about 90 percent of people who jump bail in the United States.”120

115
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-18-110 (2000). For a more thorough, if slightly outdated, discussion of
statutes and common law governing private security, see NCJRS, SCOPE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra
note 110.
116
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-18-30 to -100 (2000).
117
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1873).
118
Id.
119
Id. (emphasis added). A few states explicitly prohibit bounty hunting, while most states impose a
variety of regulations that limit the common law rules. See Brian R. Johnson & Ruth S. Stevens, The
Regulation and Control of Bail Recovery Agents: An Exploratory Study, 38 CRIM. JUST. REV. 190, 194–
200 (2013); see also Collins v. Commonwealth of Va., 720 S.E.2d 530, 532–33 (Va. 2012) (holding that
state law requiring bounty hunter licensure abrogated their common law rights to enter the state to seize
individuals). The common law rules presumably remain in effect in the 18 states that do not have statutes
regulating bounty hunting. Johnson & Stevens, supra note 119, at 200.
120
Robert J. Meadows, Bounty Hunters, 1 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 155 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012).
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Indeed, private actors may well have more authority than public
officers.121 They are not regulated by the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments
or the state analogues that restrict police actions, nor are they subject to
federal statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 or judicial remedies
like the exclusionary rule. Because they are private actors, “[p]rivate police
have been held exempt from the Fourth Amendment and the Miranda rules—
as well as from restrictions on entrapment and statutory disclosure
requirements.”122 As a result, private actors can act when public officers
cannot, without the quanta of proof that would be required to support police
action and without fear of the same remedial mechanisms. In 2013, for
example, an appellate court in North Carolina held that a private security
guard hired by a Homeowners’ Association to patrol a private neighborhood
was not a state actor and thus was permitted to conduct a traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.123
Though the authority wielded by public police officers and private
security actors can differ in meaningful ways, it is not always easy for the
casual observer to determine who is whom. Private security guards often
wear uniforms reminiscent of police uniforms, and their marked patrol
vehicles may be emblazoned with phrases indicative of governmental service,
such as “Metro Public Safety.”124 They may be permitted or required to wear
or carry badges and credentials that only a close read will identify as

121
See, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW, NEW PERSPECTIVES OF POLICING, MANAGING THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POLICING 6 (Sept. 2014) (“[P]rivate police agents, being constitutionally
classed as citizens . . ., can legally do things that public police cannot.”); Johnson & Stevens, supra
note199, at 192 (stating, in the context of bounty hunters, that private actors “have unique powers that far
surpass those of the police in America.”).
122
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1240.
123
State v. Weaver, 752 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). The court went on to hold that if such a
quantum of proof was required, it existed in this case based on the security officer’s estimate of the
vehicle’s speed. Id. The basis for that estimate was not provided, id., although a public police officer
would almost certainly have testified about specialized training and experience in visually estimating
vehicle speeds. See generally Seth W. Stoughton, Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform, 69 MIAMI L.
REV. 429, 445–54 (2015). For example, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that “an officer’s unaided
visual estimation of a vehicle’s speed is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
speeding . . . without independent verification [i.e., without the use of mechanical identification through
radar or LIDAR] if the officer is trained . . . and is experienced in visually estimating vehicle speed.”
Barberton v. Jenney, 929 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (Ohio 2010). The Fourth Circuit has adopted a more nuanced
approach, holding that an officer’s visual estimate “that a vehicle is traveling in significant excess of the
legal speed limit” may not need independent corroboration to establish a quantum of proof, but, “where an
officer estimates that a vehicle is traveling in only slight excess of the legal speed limit, and particularly
where the alleged violation is at a speed differential difficult for the naked eye to discern, an officer’s visual
speed estimate requires additional indicia of reliability to support probable cause.” United States v.
Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir. 2012). It is worth noting, in that case, the Fourth Circuit held that
the trial court clearly erred by finding the officer was trained to estimate speeds: “[T]here was not testimony
or evidence that [the officer] received any specialized training in the estimation of vehicle speeds.” Id. at
589. The court stated that visual estimates can be supported by “radar, pacing methods, or other indicia of
reliability,” and although the court’s discussion is not an endorsement of visual estimates, it may be that
specialized training can be an indication of reliability. See id. at 592–93.
Although the court divorces the two points in its discussion, it may be that specialized training is an
“additional indicia of reliability” that, like radar and pacing methods, can support probable cause.
Regardless, it appears that the private security officer in Weaver was not expected to provide the same
justification for a visual speed estimate that likely would have been required of a public police officer.
124
Weaver, 752 S.E.2d 240.
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belonging to a private actor.125 And sometimes even knowing that a
uniformed officer is paid by a private security agency, rather than a public
police department, won’t sufficiently distinguish between private and public
policing efforts.
B. Semi-Public Private Policing
Complicating the task of cleanly distinguishing between public and
private security is the close working relationship that can exist between the
two. This is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States.
“Historically, a patronizing, if not suspicious and antagonistic, attitude on the
part of public police toward their private counterparts seem[s] to have been
the dominant theme.”126 As of 1972, “no city . . . contracted directly with a
private firm for all police services, and less than 1 percent of the cities
surveyed dealt with private firms for subservice functions like crime labs.”127
In 1977, the United States Private Security Advisory Council, which advised
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration at the Department of Justice,
identified several major barriers between private and public policing, which
they “ranked [in] order of pervasiveness and intensity[:]
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

lack of mutual respect[;]
lack of communication[;]
lack of cooperation[;]
lack of law enforcement knowledge of private
security[;]
perceived competition[;]
lack of standards [for cooperation; and]
perceived corruption.”128

Perhaps the most significant barrier, however, was the belief that public
policing was about protecting public concerns, while private security efforts
were directed exclusively at private concerns.129 “[P]rivate security,” it was
thought, “ought to stay well away from the realm of investigation and public
service, and to take a purely passive and preventative role.”130
Times have changed. Although the status differential and other factors
undoubtedly remain an area of conflict between public police and private
security agencies, there appears to be a higher degree of cooperation than in
earlier eras. In 2004, the International Association of Chiefs of Police issued
125
See, e.g., 14B N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 16.0405 (“While engaged in their official duties, a private
investigator shall be allowed to carry, possess, and display a badge . . . The badge shall be gold with dark
blue lettering. . . . The badge shall be displayed in a folding pocket case with the badge displayed on one
side of the case and the Private Investigator’s pocket credential . . . displayed on the opposite side of the
case.”).
126
Sarre & Prenzler, supra note 10.
127
BRUCE L. BENSON, TO SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 18 (1998).
128
U.S. PRIVATE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2–3.
129
Id. at 5–10.
130
Sarre & Prenzler, supra note 10, at 93.
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a summit report urging laws of “the major law enforcement and private
security organizations [to] make a formal commitment to cooperation.”131
Public-private partnerships were to be viewed as “a preferred tool to address
terrorism, public disorder, and crime.”132 Further, public entities were more
willing to make use of private security agencies. By the late 1990s, it was
estimated that about 45% of local government entities were hiring private
companies to provide at least some security services.133 In all likelihood, that
number has only increased. Government agencies employ the third largest
number of private security employees, after only manufacturing firms and
retail businesses, “and the expenditures for such services run in the
multibillion dollar range.”134
What exactly are those private security agencies doing for their public
employers for that multibillion dollar payoff? The short answer is, “Just about
everything.” Private security guards have been used to supplement traditional
public policing by, for example, providing static, preventative security.
Today, thousands of federal buildings around the country are protected by
some 15,000 private security guards contracted by the Department of
Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service.135 Local governments,
meanwhile, contract with private security agencies to guard “public buildings,
sports arenas, schools, public housing projects, convention centers, courts,
airports, and other public facilities.136 Local governments also fund private
security efforts. In Washington, D.C., the Private Security Camera Incentive
Program provides “a rebate for residents, businesses, nonprofits, and religious
institutions to purchase and install security camera systems on [the exterior
of] their property and register them with the Metropolitan Police
Department.”137 The stated purpose of the program is “to help deter crime
and assist law enforcement with investigations.”138 As of October 2016, the
program has issued more than 900 rebates, funding the installation of more
than 2500 private security cameras.139
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Security personnel and private security efforts are not purely passive;
private policing can also be responsive.140 For example, local governments
contract with private security agencies to provide many different aspects of
the patrol function previously fulfilled by public police, including directing
traffic when necessary.141 Government entities might also use private
contractors to respond to some calls for service. Burglar alarms are a perfect
example: when an alarm accurately identifies a burglary in progress, it may
be vastly preferable to have a police officer—with a potentially faster
response time and the benefit of more training, better equipment, and the
availability of backup—respond to the scene. Unfortunately, alarms are
rarely accurate; various studies have found that false positives account for up
to 95% of all alarms.142 And there can be lots of alarms; “alarm responses
account for 10 percent to 30 percent of all calls for police service.”143 A
Department of Justice report estimated in 1998 that responding to alarms cost
public law enforcement agencies $1.5 billion144 (more than $2.2 billion in
2016 terms145). To preserve scarce resources, many police agencies have
stopped responding to non-verified alarms, meaning alarms that are triggered
but have not been verified by a video or auditory feed or a live complainant
such as a resident or security guard.146 And when public police pull out,
“private police can contribute . . . by patrolling and by handling certain
service functions, such as alarm response.”147
Beyond the relatively limited context of burglary alarms, private security
personnel also engage in proactive policing by patrolling assigned beats.148
Although the paradigmatic deployment of private security patrols involves
personnel reporting incidents to sworn, public officers,149 private security
employees engage in what many modern viewers would consider to be more
invasive law enforcement activities. Parking enforcement is perhaps the least
objectionable aspect of proactive, invasive policing,150 but it may also be true
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that private police perform “more stops, searches, and interrogations than is
often imagined.”151
On some occasions, semi-public private policing blurs the line even
further, as when political subdivisions hire private security companies to be
the primary provider of policing services.152 Kalamazoo, Michigan, for
example, contracted with the private security company Charles Services “for
street patrol and traffic control.”153 Under that arrangement, “private
personnel were sworn in as deputy sheriffs in order to ensure compliance to
the law, but the personnel were paid by the hour so that they could be released
during slow periods and provided in larger force during peak periods.”154
Hiring a private firm as the primary provider of policing services isn’t
common, but Kalamazoo isn’t unique. At least seven other jurisdictions have
contracted with private security agencies to provide policing services,
including two—Indian Springs, Florida, and Buffalo Creek, West Virginia—
that did so for over five years.155
C. Semi-Private Public Policing
Just as private security employees can operate as semi-public entities,
public police can be semi-privatized. Examples can be found in special
jurisdiction agencies, special appointments, and the widespread practice of
private employers hiring off-duty officers to engage in law enforcement or
security services.
Special jurisdiction agencies are police organizations that serve either a
special geographic jurisdiction that does not align with political
subdivisions—university or transit police, for example—or engage in
specialized enforcement activities, such as the Enforcement Division of
Nevada’s Gaming Control Board.156 As of 2008, the last year for which data
were available, there were more 1,700 special jurisdiction agencies that
employed just under 57,000 full-time, sworn officers.157 Many of these,
perhaps most, do little to blur the line between public and private policing.158
But some do. The Federal Reserve System, a somewhat unique public/private
entity, has its own law enforcement agency, the United States Federal Reserve
Police.159 Officers may be “designated or authorized by the [Federal Reserve
151
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Board] or a reserve bank,” and are authorized to carry firearms, make arrests,
and access law enforcement information.160 Another example, and one less
connected to government entities, can be found in private universities’ police
departments. Campus police officers at Yale, for example, “wear New Haven
Police Department badges and are invested with their powers of arrest through
the City of New Haven,” even though “the Yale Police Department and New
Haven Police Department are in fact two separate entities.”161 The blurring
of public and private policing can be even more dramatic. Headquartered in
Memphis, Tennessee, the FedEx Corporation is a publicly traded
multinational business organization with annual revenue of more than $50
billion in 2016.162 It doesn’t just maintain a massive fleet of air carriers that
service more than 350 airports, it also maintains a private police force.
Because Tennessee law allows for the creation of “transportation security
officers”163 who have “all of the powers of a peace officer,”164 FedEx employs
a (relatively small) number of officers can who can make arrests, apply for
warrants, initiate pursuits, carry weapons, and participate in a Regional Joint
Terrorism Task Force.165
Tennessee is not the only state that allows private entities to establish
police forces. In Arizona, a private railroad company can, on its own,
designate “railroad police,” who “aid and supplement . . . law enforcement
agencies . . . in the protection of railroad property and the protection of the
persons and property of railroad passengers and employees.”166 Other states
blur the line between public and private policing even more. In Virginia, a
private corporation or the private owner of “any place within the
Commonwealth” can ask a circuit court judge to appoint a “special
conservator of the peace.”167 A special conservator can be designated a “lawenforcement officer” and may identify themselves as “police” on uniform or
badge, including a badge that bears the state seal.168 Special conservators can
serve up to a four-year term, and in that time “have all the powers, functions,
duties, responsibilities and authority” of a police officer, at least within “such
geographical confines as the court may deem appropriate . . . within the
confines of the county, city or town where the corporate applicant is
located.”169 Courts may, but need not, “limit the use of flashing lights and
sirens on personal vehicles used by the conservator in the performance of his
160
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duties.”170 A special conservator must register with the Department of
Criminal Justice Services and may have to go through basic police training,
although exemptions are permissible.171 There are, however, benefits to going
through a police academy. A special conservator “who has completed the
minimum training standards established by the Department of Criminal
Justice Services . . . has the authority to [e]ffect arrests, using up to the same
amount of force as would be allowed to a law-enforcement officer employed
by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions when making a
lawful arrest.”172 Special conservators of the peace are public officers who
may be requested by a private corporation or property owner, but the special
conservator is a public officer and not (necessarily) an employee of the
requesting party. Special Conservators are, in essence, privately requested
police officers without an agency; they work outside both the normal market
controls of a private security company and the normal political controls of a
local police officer.
Not every private entity can create their own police force, nor do most of
them need to do so. Private interests can leverage public policing by shifting
the costs of security from their own expenditure to the public coffers.
According to a review of Walmart stores in the Tampa area, for example, local
police agencies “logged nearly 16,800 calls” over the course of a year, or “two
calls an hour, every hour, every day.”173 One officer described the situation
this way: “We are, as a department, at the mercy of what they [Walmart] want
to do.”174 According to retail analyst Burt Flickinger, “Law enforcement
becomes in effect a taxpayer-paid private security source for Walmart.”175
Private industry does not always rely on the largess of public police;
various investigative efforts may be privately funded. In the early 1980s, the
National Automobile Theft Bureau, a not-for-profit organization “dedicated
exclusively to fighting insurance fraud and crime,”176 provided personnel and
funding for a joint operation with the Tennessee Department of Revenue and
the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department that, under the supervision of
a prosecutor, used extensive undercover investigations to target vehicle theft
in eastern Tennessee.177 More recently, licensed taxis in Los Angeles pay a
$30 monthly fee to fund police sting operations directed at ferreting out
unlicensed taxis since 2006.178 In the modern era of ride-sharing apps like
Uber and Lyft, this funding has been used to identify drivers who illegally
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accept cash payment (instead of demanding payment through the app, as
required).179
Businesses can acquire police services even more directly by hiring
uniformed officers to provide law enforcement services while they’re offduty, a practice known as “moonlighting.”180 According to a recent survey of
more than 160 police agencies that collectively employ over 143,000 fulltime, sworn officers—almost a fifth of all non-federal officers in the
country—the vast majority of police agencies permit officers to engage in
moonlighting.181 And officers take advantage of that opportunity more
frequently than one might expect: the agencies that track the relevant data
reported that 42.63% of their full-time, sworn employees worked in a law
enforcement capacity for a private employer.182 To the casual observer, it can
be difficult or impossible to distinguish between moonlighting and public
policing, as off-duty officers typically wear the same uniform and provide the
same wide range of services that on-duty officers might otherwise provide.
The single most important difference—how an officer is being
compensated—is something that observers simply are not privy to.
[U]niformed officers may be paid for providing security at a night
club or bar or for directing traffic outside of a church or synagogue.
Officers may also receive free or discounted rent at an apartment
complex (so-called “courtesy officers”) in exchange for parking their
marked police vehicle in a visible spot or for responding, when
off-duty, to non-emergency calls like noise complaints. Officers may
be compensated directly by the private entity that hires them, or the
employer may pay the city or agency so the officer’s compensation is
channeled through the public payroll system. Officers may also
receive collateral benefits from private employers, such as employee
discounts and earlier-than-public access to information and
products.183
The manner in which officers engage in moonlighting can further blur the
line. Some agencies employ in-house coordinators to facilitate officers’ offduty employment; private employers who want to hire off-duty officers
approach the agency itself, which then makes the job available to officers.
Other agencies take a more hands-off approach, leaving it to private
employers and individual officers to find each other and work out the details
of a moonlighting job, subject only to agency approval. This has created
something of a private market for off-duty officers. Phoenix-based security
179
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firm Law Enforcement Specialists, for example, takes a traditional approach
to providing security personnel, but offers off-duty officers instead of regular
security guards.184 The technology start-up CopsForHire takes a different
tack, having establishing a “platform for the on-demand marketplace of cops
working off-duty.”185 Their online marketplace follows the example of Uber,
the popular ride-sharing app, by connecting private employers with local
officers who would be interested in working off-duty. The appeal of this
approach isn’t limited to officers who independently seek their own
moonlighting opportunities; police agencies can also adopt the CopsForHire
platform for internal use, essentially hiring CopsForHire to play a
coordinating role.186
The existence of special jurisdiction police agencies, the special
appointment of officers, and the widespread practice of moonlighting all have
the potential to partially privatize public policing.
D. Public Policing
In contrast with the specialized agencies, officers, and duties discussed in
the previous section, one might think that an on-duty officer at a municipal
public agency is a clear and definitive example of purely public policing.
Sometimes that may be the case. But certain investigative techniques,
funding and equipment, and the reliance on private parties to assist with police
investigations can all blur the line between public and private policing.
On at least some occasions, officers act in an official capacity outside of
the jurisdiction in which they have lawful authority. The International Liaison
Program implemented by the New York Police Department, for example, has
stationed Intelligence Officers in 13 cities far outside of the geographic
boundaries of New York. “The world-wide presence allows NYPD officers
at the scene of a terrorist attack to provide information to the NYPD’s
counterterrorism command structure.”187 When that is the case, officers may
be effectively limited to doing no more than what any “ordinary” individual
might do. In essence, officers may fulfill their public position even without
the mantle of state authority.
Outside the relatively confined context of extrajudicial action, several
common investigative tactics depend on obscuring the line separating public
and private action, and for good reason; officers simply would not be effective
if they operated in a way that continually advertised their official affiliation.
But the very reason that these tactics are effective also creates the potential
for them to blur the line between public and private action. In plainclothes
operations, for example, officers engage in surveillance or proactive patrol
184
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while wearing civilian attire rather than police uniforms. The objective is to
observe people without advertising officers’ official identities until it
becomes advantageous to do so; e.g., when initiating an investigative
detention. The difficulty of identifying officers in these circumstances has
become an issue in several high profile incidents, including the shootings of
Amadou Diallo and Sean Bell.188 Undercover operations blur the line of
public and private policing even more, as officers assume the role of a civilian.
There are different degrees of “cover” under which an officer can operate. At
one end of the spectrum is superficial cover, as with officers engaged in
prostitution stings or reverse-stings.189 Other operations require modest
preparation, as with officers who create misleading personal accounts to
investigate child pornography.190 At the far end of the spectrum is
sophisticated cover identities that require what is known as “backstopping,”
the creation of fictitious information to support a cover identity.191 The
paradigmatic example of a sophisticated undercover operation involves an
officer using a cover identity to infiltrate a criminal network,192 but that is
hardly the only example. In “stash-house stings,” undercover officers recruit
suspects to help them rob non-existent drug dealers, which requires them to
create a fake stash house (where the arrest will ultimately take place).193 Some
undercover operations can be even more sophisticated. In late 2013, for
example, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
was rocked by the public disclosure of a series of sting operations in which
ATF agents operated fake pawn shops or other private businesses that

188
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conducted illegal transactions (such as purchasing illegal firearms and stolen
goods) so as to eventually arrest their “customers.”194
Beyond plainclothes and undercover operations, the use of informants is
another common investigative practice that can blur the line between public
and private policing. 195 Informants can be passive, in the sense that they pass
along information to the police but play no other role in the investigation, but
it is active informants, who engage in information gathering or participate in
operations at the explicit direction of officers, who raise the specter of private
policing. Informants can set law enforcement priorities,196 work to attract
would-be wrong-doers,197 and facilitate prolonged investigations.198
Like certain investigative techniques, the way in which police acquire and
deploy surveillance or investigative equipment can blur the blue line,
particularly in the modern era of stretched public budgets. As part of its 2006
downtown, urban revitalization efforts, for example, the Minneapolis Police
Department partnered with the Target Corporation to install security
cameras.199 The number grew from the original 30 to over 100 cameras
deployed in the 40-block area, monitored by both private security personnel
and the city police department.200 In 2012, Target Corporation’s Vice
President of Assets Protection estimated that Target has partnered with about
two dozen cities to provide similar access to security cameras. Target is far
from alone. A range of private businesses in metropolitan Grand Rapids, for
example, allow public police agencies to access and monitor their security
video feeds in real time.201 In Minneapolis, the SafeZone Collaborative
formed a 501(c)(3) organization, then successfully lobbied for the
metropolitan area to be zoned as a Downtown Improvement District (a type
194
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See NATAPOFF, supra note 195; Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover
Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2009); Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage?
Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145 (2009).
199
Bob Giles, Minneapolis Public-Private Surveillance Effort with Target Corp., SECURITY INFO
WATCH
(Apr.
18,
2012),
http://www.securityinfo
watch.com/article/10702225/minneapolis-safezone.
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201
Garret Ellison, Police Getting Real-Time Access to Private Security Cameras in Downtown Grand
Rapids,
MLIVE
(June
29,
2014),
http://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/index.ssf/2014/06/police_getting_rea
l-time_acces.html.
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of Business Improvement District202), where a special tax on property owners
funds continued security efforts.203
Public officers have come to rely on private actors for everyday police
operations. Private police support services—such as private companies that
provide call-taking and dispatch services204 or private forensic laboratories
that contract with police agencies205—are common, but so, too, is private
entanglement in what would otherwise appear to be public police
investigations. Before it merged with the Insurance Crime Prevention
Institute, for example, the National Automobile Theft Bureau—a private, notfor-profit organization supported by the private insurance industry—managed
databases that collected information about stolen vehicles.206 In many states,
law enforcement officers were required to report information about motor
vehicle thefts to the Bureau, including details about the vehicle and the theft
itself.207 A more contemporary and mundane example of officer reliance on
private actors may be found in the context of DUI enforcement. According
to the most recent Uniform Crime Reporting data, more than 1 million persons
were arrested for driving under the influence in 2015.208 Some number of
those arrestees were subjected to a blood draw, initiated by officers to obtain
the suspects’ blood-alcohol levels. In 2016, the Supreme Court held that
warrantless blood-testing for DUI purposes violated the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches absent exigent circumstances or,
presumably, the suspect’s consent.209 Regardless of whether a blood sample
is taken pursuant to a warrant, exigency, or consent, it is typically not an
officer who draws blood. Although precise data are unavailable, it seems safe
to say that task is typically left to a medical professional;210 indeed, state law
202
For more on Business Improvement Districts, see generally Richard Briffault, A Government for
Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999).
203
Giles, supra note199.
204
Michelle Perin, Private 911 Police Telecommunications: Same Job, Different Boss, OFFICER.COM
(July
16,
2013),
http://www.officer.com/article/
10959085/private-9-1-1-police-telecommunications-same-job-different-boss.
205
JJ Velasquez, Austin Contracts Dallas Forensic Lab To Address Rape Kit Backlog, COMMUNITY
IMPACT NEWSPAPER (Texas) (Nov. 3, 2016, 2:02 pm) https://communityimpact.com/austin/centralaustin/city-county/2016/11/03/aust
in-contracts-dallas-forensic-lab-address-rape-kit-backlog/; Police Eye Partnership with Portland Crime
Lab,
TOWN
OF
CAPE
ELIZABETH
NEWS
(Mar.
31,
2008),
https://www.capeelizabeth.com/news/2008/crimelab.html; Palm Bay Partners with Cellmark Forensics,
SPACE COAST DAILY (Feb. 8, 2014), http://spacecoastdaily.com/2014/02/palm-bay-partners-withcellmark-forensics/.
206
Gary T. Marx, The Interweaving of Public & Private Police Undercover Work, in PRIVATE
POLICING (Clifford D. Shearing & Phillip C. Stenning eds., 1987).
207
Id.
208
FBI,
2015
Crime
in
the
United
States
tbl.29,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170216005201/https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.2015/tables/table-29 (last visited June 21, 2017).
209
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
210
The Supreme Court, at least, has assumed that it will be medical professionals, not officers,
conducting blood draws. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2167, 579 U.S. at ___ (“A technician with medical
training uses a syringe to draw a blood sample from the veins of the subject, who must remain still during
the procedure, and then the sample is shipped to a separate laboratory for measurement of its alcohol
concentration.”); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013) (“[A] police officer must typically
transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and obtain the assistance of someone with
appropriate medical training before conducting a blood test.”). This is not to suggest that we should take
the Court’s unsupported empirical assertions at face value. For a discussion of the Court’s reliance on
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may impose such a limitation.211 In short, in the context of blood samples,
officers’ investigative efforts are heavily dependent on the cooperation of
private actors.212 In some jurisdictions, “cooperation” is misleading; the
assistance of medical professionals is so essential that state law may require
medical authorities to assist police investigations by performing blood draws
upon an officer’s request when the suspect consents or when the state’s
implied-consent rule is implicated.213
IV. POLICE REFORM & THE BLURRED BLUE LINE
The prior two Parts illustrate how the popular conception of policing as
an exclusively or primarily governmental activity is wrong as both a historical
and contemporary matter, demonstrating that the Thin Blue Line is neither as
thin nor as blue as it first appears. This Part explores the implications of that
observation in the context of police reform. Calls for police reform are
nothing new; indeed, criticism of modern policing predates policing itself.214
Over at least the last 85 years, a legion of public commissions have studied
policing at either a national or local level and used their findings to make
reform recommendations, from the Wickersham Commission’s 1931 Report
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, which addressed issues with Prohibition
enforcement, to President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
which released its final report in 2015.215 Private organizations and nonprofits
questionable facts and the problems that can arise, see Stoughton, supra note 102; Allison Orr Larsen,
Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2013); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact
Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012).
211
See, e.g., N.Y. STATE VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(4)(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017
legislation) (“At the request of a police officer, the following persons may withdraw blood for the purpose
of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein: a physician, a registered professional nurse, a
registered physician assistant, a certified nurse practitioner, or an advanced emergency medical technician
as certified by the department of health.”).
Officers are not entirely dependent on private actors. Arizona law allows blood to be drawn for
investigative purposes by “a physician, a registered nurse, or another qualified person,” ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1388 (2017), and state courts have read “another qualified person” to include officers who
receive specialized specific trained in blood draws. Arizona v. May, 112 P.3d 39, 42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
The Arizona Governor’s Office of Highway Safety provides the principal funding for the state’s Law
Enforcement Phlebotomist Program, which certifies officers after a one-week training course is funded by
the state.
Ariz. Governor’s Office of Highway Safety, Phlebotomy Program,
https://www.azgohs.gov/programs/default.asp?ID=48. It is not yet clear how this program will adapt to
the restrictions on warrantless blood testing. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 579 U.S.
___ (2016).
212
I recognize, of course, that there are a number of public medical institutions, including university
hospitals that do not fit into a strict definition of “private actors.”
213
Ordinarily, a search warrant can compel a suspect to furnish a blood sample, Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966), but a writ of assistance would be needed to compel a third-party to
facilitate the search. State law typically permits medical providers to assist law enforcement upon request.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1388 (stating that a medical professional “may withdraw blood”);
N.Y. STATE VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(4)(a)(1) (similar). Some states, however, go further by requiring
assistance as a matter of statutory law. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(c) (“[W]hen a blood . . . test
is specified as the type of chemical analysis by a law enforcement officer, a physician, registered nurse,
emergency medical technician, or other qualified person shall withdraw the blood sample . . . and no
further authorization or approval is required”.). It is not yet clear how mandatory cooperation statutes will
be applied now that involuntary blood draws request a warrant or exigent circumstances.
214
See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
215
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, NO. 11 REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 3–6 (1931); PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF
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have done the same,216 as have academics and other commentators217 Since
the shooting death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri, Police Officer
Darren Wilson in the summer of 2014 and the national emergence of the
#BlackLivesMatter movement,218 there has been an unprecedented consensus
among community members, commentators, politicians, and police
executives that reform of some type is necessary.219
The relevance of the blurred blue line to police reform efforts depends on
one’s perspective on reform and the emphasis one puts on different types of
reform.220 One plausible position, for example, is that the conflation of public
and private policing as it is described in this Article has no conceptual or
practical implications for police reform. Such conflation lacks conceptual
salience to the extent that one’s interest in reform is limited to a particular
category of actions—the infringement of individual privacy, liberty, and
autonomy—only when those actions are performed by a particular entity—
government agents. In that case, it may be argued, the dual observations that
both governmental and non-governmental actors perform the same invasive
actions and that they both also engage in behaviors that are not invasive may
be irrelevant. And even if there were conceptual implications, one might
reject the implications of the blurred blue line on practical grounds. Police
reform, the argument goes, can be a distressingly slow and uneven process
when it is limited to public police agencies; attempts to broaden the way we
look at policing could further limit both the scope and pace of reform.
Those positions, and others of the same vein, are not without some merit,
but they miss the point. My argument is neither that the distinctions between
public and private policing should be ignored for purposes of reform nor that
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 33 (May 2015),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/
taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf; Corruption in Uniform; Excerpts of What the Commission Found:
Loyalty
Over
Integrity,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
7,
1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/07/nyregion/corruption-uniform-excerpts-what-commission-foundloyalty-over-integrity.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the Knapp and Mollen Commissions); JAMES G.
KOLTS, SPECIAL COUNSEL, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT (July 1992),
http://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0001-0023.pdf; EISENHOWER FOUND., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf
(last visited June 27, 2017) (discussing the Kerner Commission); HUM. RTS. WATCH, SHIELDED FROM
JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE CHRISTOPHER
COMMISSION
REPORT
[hereinafter
SHIELDED
FROM
JUSTICE],
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo73.htm (last visited June 27, 2017).
216
See, e.g., SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 215 (detailing reports of incidents in various cities
to demonstrate barriers to police accountability).
217
No single footnote, nor even an entire article, is sufficient to list the range of scholars who have
studied policing and offered suggestions for improvement on everything from agency culture to the use of
force.
218
The #BlackLiveMatter hashtag first appeared on social media after neighborhood watch volunteer
George Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Martin. About the Black Lives Matter Network,
BLACKLIVESMATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited June 27, 2017). It grew into an
organized movement after the events in Ferguson. A HerStory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement,
BLACKLIVESMATTER,
http://blacklivesmatter.c
om/herstory/ (last visited June 27, 2017).
219
This is not to suggest that all parties agree on what police reform should look like; that is certainly
not the case.
220
See, e.g., Stoughton, supra note 5, at 611–12 (identifying calls for reforms to training, equipment,
policies and procedures, and law).
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both should be targeted for reform. Instead, my point is that a more holistic
understanding of what policing is can better inform conversations about what
policing should be. Even divorced from any particular policy preference, the
blurred blue line is a relevant consideration for anyone interested in police
reform. In every incarnation, reform efforts are directed at changing the
nature of the police community/relationship, using a combination of
incentives and disincentives to change officer behavior. A broader
recognition of public and private policing, after all, can inform both the goals
and mechanisms, the ends and the means, of police reform. In the following
sections, I explain how a broader conception of policing, one that appreciates
the blurred blue line, may affect the way reformers approach information
gathering, the distribution of police resources, and the regulation of policing.
A. Information Gathering
Expanding the conventional understanding of policing to include at least
some aspects of both public and private policing offers a potentially rich
source of new information. There are, of course, meaningful differences that
should lead us to be wary of casual comparisons. In the context of private
security, Elizabeth Joh has persuasively argued that there are at least five
dimensions of variation (goals, resources, legal powers, jurisdiction, and
organizational location) and four distinct types of private policing (protective
policing, intelligence policing, publicly contracted policing, and corporate
policing) that make it a mistake to view private policing as a monolithic
entity.221 In the same vein, it would be a mistake to conflate public and private
policing by citing to similarities without appreciating the dimensions of
variation and distinct types of policing being performed. Accounting for
those distinctions, however, may provide valuable information about how the
various types of policing are performed differently given not just the
variations that Joh identified, but also sharp distinctions in training,
equipment, staffing, and agency principles. Those differences, once
identified, can be scoured for lessons that may be applicable across the blurred
blue line.
Recall, for example, that registered or licensed security guards in South
Carolina who are “hired or employed to provide security services on a specific
property [are] granted the authority and arrest power given to sheriff’s
deputies” while on that property. 222 Whether and how those private security
services differ in practice from geographic security services provided by
government entities, such as court security officers and county sheriff’s
deputies, can inform a range of policy decisions about who should secure
government properties and, by going beyond the limited consideration of cost,
how they should do so. The same thing is true with the private security patrol
function; a superficial acknowledgement that it exists could be deepened to a
221

Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 596.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-18-110 (2000). For a more thorough, if slightly outdated, discussion of
statutes and common law governing private security, see NCJRS, SCOPE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra
note 110.
222
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more robust understanding about how it compares to public police patrol not
just in terms of cost, which is the most common consideration,223 but also in
terms of legitimacy and effectiveness given the different aspects of the police
function: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service provision. That,
in turn, could lead to a more informed policy decision to discourage or
promote greater integration of public and private policing.224 These issues
have been formally addressed internationally, but have received scant
attention in the United States.
There is, perhaps, little public interest in the static security or private
patrol function themselves, but it is also true that the blurred blue line can be
a source of information about the more controversial issues of police
practices, including the use of force. It is often said that the state holds a
monopoly on violence. It would be more accurate to say that the state holds
a monopoly on legitimizing violence; government determines whether the use
of force is permissible ex ante, primarily through the legislative process, and
ex post, primarily through the executive (law enforcement) and judicial
(adjudication) processes. Although a number of studies have sought to
identify factors that correlate with police violence,225 it remains true that there
is a startling lack of reliable national or regional data about police uses of
force.226 A number of voices have called for more robust data-gathering
efforts, including some voices within the federal government itself,227 and it
may well be that case that expanding the dataset by including the use of force
by private police may provide valuable insights. If a comparative review
finds that there is a discrepancy in public and private police use force, which
seems likely, thorough analysis can determine whether that discrepancy is
solely attributable to the different functions that public and private officers
fulfill, whether other factors—training, equipment, culture, organizational
structure, the distinct legal standards that apply, and so on—affect how force
is used. Further, analysis may help identify the role of force in advancing a
223
See, e.g., John Kiedrowski et al., Police Civilianisation in Canada: A Mixed Methods
Investigation, 27 POLICING & SOC’Y 1 (Feb. 6, 2017).
224
See, e.g., PLURAL POLICING, supra note 10, at 12–23, 34–54 (discussing the integration of formal
police bodies with private policing efforts in Netherlands and the funds allocated by the United Kingdom’s
Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 toward developing auxiliary patrol regimes).
225
There are far too many sources to cite in a single footnote, but they include Christopher J. Harris,
Police Use of Improper Force: A Systemic Review of the Evidence, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 25 (2009);
GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF FORCE (2004); William
Terrill & Michael D. Resig, Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force, 40 J. RESEARCH IN CRIM. &
DELINQUENCY 291 (2003); Geoffrey P. Alpert & John M. MacDonald, Police Use of Force: An Analysis
of Organizational Characteristics, 18 JUST. Q. 393 (2001); GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. (NCJRS), NCJRS 183648, AN ANALYSIS
OF POLICE USE-OF-FORCE DATA (2000); Charles Crawford & Ronald Burns, Predictors of the Police Use
of Force, 1 POLICE Q. 41 (1998); Robert Worden, The “Causes” of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence
on Police Use of Force, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE
OF FORCE (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995); James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force:
Research & Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165 (1988); Richard E. Kania & Wade C. Mackey, Police Violence as a
Function of Community Characteristics 15 CRIM. 27 (1977).
226
GEFFREY ALPERT ET AL., Untitled Book, Chapter 3 (“While individual police agencies collect
information about their officers, providing a ‘worm’s eye view’ of specific incidents, there is an almost
complete lack of national data, effectively precluding a broader ‘bird’s eye view.’”).
227
See, e.g., FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, NATIONAL USE-OF-FORCE DATA COLLECTION,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/use-of-force (last visited June 27, 2017).
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particular function. To the extent that the public and private policing share
the same goals, for example, one might study how the different rates of force
relate to relative effectiveness in deterring crime or building public trust.
B. The Distribution of Police Resources
In addition to providing information about practices that may translate
between private and public policing, the blurred blue line can be a source of
information about the distribution of police resources and the nature of
policing in different contexts. Policing is widely viewed as redistributive; the
communities that provide the lion’s share of the tax revenue that funds public
policing efforts are typically not where the majority of policing takes place.
Or, to provide a more nuanced view, those communities may receive a
different mix of policing services than poorer communities; more community
policing and problem-oriented policing, for example, and less enforcement
oriented or zero-tolerance policing. Expanding the conception of policing to
include private policing efforts, however, may change our understanding: the
distribution of police resources may be less uneven while, at the same time,
the nature of police activities may be even more lopsided. Returning to the
debate about police uses of force, for example, the fact that black people are
affected disproportionately is often explained, at least in part, by the fact that
officers have more of a presence in the lower-income, higher-crime minority
communities. This may well be the case if we define “officers” as public
officers working their regular duty assignments. But if we take into account
private policing efforts, the picture may change – defining police more
broadly, we may find that there is a heavier police presence in high-income
communities than was previously appreciated. If that’s true, a racial
discrepancy in the use of force may have less to do with police presence and
officer-civilian interactions and more to do with the nature of policing and
the quality of those interactions. So much seems intuitive—officers are, after
all, far more likely to use force when making an arrest than during the course
of a interaction unrelated to an enforcement action—but accounting for the
full scope of policing activities will provide substantially more precision than
current data permits.
Even outside the use-of-force context, efforts to accurately chart the
distribution of police resources may fall short if they do not take the blurred
blue line into account. These accounts are important, and not just for
traditional crime control reasons. Economic modeling suggests that the
allocation of police resources can influence crime, of course, but it can also
affect housing prices, aggregate welfare, income inequality, and
integration.228
If correct, those observations have important policy
implications. “[S]ocieties with high levels of income inequality may face a
complicated dilemma. Concentrated [police] protection may maximize
aggregate welfare but exacerbate social disparities. In contrast, in more
equalitarian societies, dispersed protection simultaneously maximizes
228
Sebastion Galiani et al., Stirring Up a Hornets’ Nest: Geographic Distribution of Crime (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 22166, Apr. 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22166.pdf.
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aggregate welfare and reduces social disparities.”229 But exploring the
relationship between current practice and its policy implications assumes that
current practice—the allocation of protective services—is easy identifiable.
David Thacher, for example, has compared geographic measurements of
income inequality against the number of publicly employed police employees
per crime committed in that geographic area to find that “[p]olice protection
has become more concentrated in the most advantaged communities—those
with the highest per-capita incomes and the largest share of white
residents.”230 Even relatively sophisticated measures may provide a
misleading picture if they fail to account for the blurred blue line.
Contemporary accounts may be under-inclusive if they omit private policing
efforts, and they may be over-inclusive if they assume that public policing
efforts have a consistently public orientation.
In a less academic vein, the allocation of police resources has traditionally
been primarily concerned with police patrol.231 That is, there has historically
been a heavy emphasis on making sure that there was sufficient coverage,
which is often defined by referring to the number of officers that cover a
geographic area given the number and nature of calls for service.232 Agencies
make allocations based on the estimated number of on-duty officers, but while
traditional methods account for factors like officers who are out sick or on
vacation, they do not directly take into account factors like private policing
efforts or officer moonlighting (that is, off-duty officers who are working in
a police capacity for private employers). Incongruously, agencies that justify
moonlighting policies by referring to the ameliorative effect of having offduty officers handle calls for service may not take those effects into account
when designing their patrol systems. A more comprehensive understanding
of policing resources may provide benefits to the allocation of on-duty
resources.
C. The Regulation of Policing
Understanding the blurred blue line may also prove to be an important
consideration in how society regulates the practice of policing. Effective
regulation requires an accurate understanding of the regulated activity. As I
have written elsewhere in the context of constitutional regulation,233 factual
misunderstandings about the police environment, police practices, and officer
motivations can result in a misalignment between the legal or administrative
regulation and the world that regulation was intended to effect. That
misalignment, in turn, can result in the over- or under-regulation of policing,
which is to say the over- or under-protection of rights. A similar observation
may apply in the context of public and private policing: an incomplete
understanding of policing can lead to regulation that is focused exclusively
229
230
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(2011).
231

See, e.g., FRITSCH ET AL., supra note 102.
Id.
233
Stoughton, supra note 102.
232

2017]

The Blurred Blue Line

151

on policing as it is conducted by public officials not because the regulatory
decision was driven by informed consideration of the options but instead
because the blurred blue line was not considered at all. In this section, I
discuss two possible ways that a broader conception of policing might affect
constitutional and sub-constitutional regulation.
The Fourth Amendment limits the government’s ability to infringe on
civilians by requiring that such invasions be “reasonable.”234 This restriction
has given rise to what has been described as a “mess”235 of
“embarrass[ing]”236 rules that seek to guide courts as they answer two
interrelated questions: whether the government engaged in a search at all and,
if so, whether that search was reasonable. With regard to the first part of that
inquiry, the Supreme Court has developed the third-party doctrine, which
obviates Fourth Amendment protections for information that has been
knowingly revealed to a third party. The doctrine flows from the propositions
that the Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy and
that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information that they share. 237 The third-party doctrine is deeply
controversial among legal scholars and civil rights advocates. It is “the Fourth
Amendment rule scholars love to hate[,] the Lochner of search and seizure
law, widely criticized as profoundly misguided.”238 Many, though not all, of
the criticisms arise from the observation that an individual can share
something and still expect it to be private and the intuition that such an
expectation ought to be honored. Consider, for example, the criticism of the
Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, which held that bank records—
checks, deposit clips, and the like—were not protected by the Fourth
Amendment in part because the information was “voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees.”239 In his highly influential search &
seizure treatise, Wayne LaFave criticized that decision, quoting a California
state court opinion that read, “It cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank
expects that the documents, such as checks, which he transmits to the bank in
the course of his business operations will remain private.”240 As Criminal
Procedure students know, criticisms of that nature are grounded in the
observation that, in many contexts, our social norms rely on other people not
looking at, not remembering, or not analyzing information that we display to
them. We expect that, in most cases, people will use any information we give
them for the limited purpose that we gave it to them. But not the police.
Officers look at us differently. A number of objections to the third-party
doctrine reflect discomfort with the idea of ignoring broad social norms about
the communication of information.
234

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The blurred blue line both complicates the picture and offers a principled
way to think about the third-party doctrine in non-absolute terms. Critics who
advocate for the eradication of the third-party doctrine because it does not
incorporate our behavioral norms and supporters who advocate for its
continued application because it has some value even though it cuts against
social expectations may both have an incomplete picture in mind. In some
contexts, we casually expose information with the expectation that it will
remain private. But in other contexts a reasonable person should know that
the information they disclose is likely to be subjected to more than casual
review, even if such review isn’t by the police. The blurred blue line can help
draw that line; sometimes it’s reasonable to expect that a private party will
look at information in the same way that a public police officer would. A
more holistic view of policing might lead one to the position that the knowing
exposure of information that a reasonable person could expect to be subjected
to police-like scrutiny obviates the expectation of privacy, but a knowing
exposure of information to a private party who is not reasonably expected to
analyze that information in a police-like way does not. Applying the thirdparty doctrine through the filter of the blurred blue line might lead to a rule
that bank records lack Fourth Amendment protection (to the extent they may
be subject to internal audit by bank personnel) but call records remain
protected because no one at the phone company is likely to subject them to
critical analysis. There are, no doubt, a host of considerations that my hastily
sketched out approach fails to take into account. My point here is not that
limiting the third-party doctrine is normatively better than leaving it
unchanged, eliminating it, or modifying it in some other way. Instead, my
point is only that the blurred blue line offers a perspective that is largely
missing from existing conversations about the constitutional regulation of
policing.
A full appreciation for the blurred blue line may also provoke new
conversations about the sub-constitutional regulation of policing, including
what I describe here as semi-public private policing and semi-private public
policing. As discussed above, I surveyed several hundred police agencies that
collectively employ almost 20% of the non-federal officers in the country
about moonlighting, the practice of permitting off-duty officers to work in a
police capacity for private employers.241 I found substantial variety in the
way the practice is regulated by state law and administrative policies.242 For
example, under California law, the public agency that employs the officer
bears “‘any and all civil and criminal liability’ arising from an off-duty
officer’s actions, even those taken on behalf of a private employer.”243
Mississippi, in contrast, makes the private employer liable for an off-duty
officer’s actions and omissions; the state and state subdivisions are explicitly
exempted.244 Given the frequency and importance of police moonlighting,
this area is overdue for serious policy discussions.
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The same may be said for private efforts that support public policing.
Increasingly, traditional police agencies are relying on private entities to not
only gather massive quantities of information, but also to analyze that
information. For police agencies, the goal is actionable intelligence; private
vendors can provide information that agencies can readily act upon.
Summaries of Federal Bureau of Investigation memoranda filed in United
States v. Rettenmaier, for example, reflected that the FBI used the Geek
Squad, Best Buy’s computer repair service, as a “tripwire” to detect child
pornography on customers’ computers.245 The Bureau maintained what was
described as a “close liaison with the Geek Squad management in an effort to
glean case initiations and to support the division's Computer Intrusion and
Cyber Crime programs.” Geek Squad technicians were reportedly paid as
confidential informants, receiving a bounty each time they found
incriminating evidence.
Private actors do more than gather and sift through data; governmental
agencies also rely on them to provide insight into how to use the information
that has been collected and assessed. Police agencies and political
subdivisions rely on private analysis to identify a range of problems and to
develop operational solutions. For example, Palantir Law Enforcement, a
division of a California-based company named for the magical seeing stones
in the Lord of the Rings, advertises in its marketing materials that it “provides
the LAPD with a full suite of analytical capabilities, including geospatial
search, trend analysis, link charts, timelines, and histograms.” 246 It does so
by reviewing data from multiple databases and making connections that might
otherwise elude investigators. As a result, the investigative response is
predicated on the results of third-party analysis: it is the private entity that
identifies whom investigators should speak to, how to infiltrate criminal
organizations, and so on.247 Further, police agencies, like law schools or other
institutions of higher education, may hire strategic consultants to review
practices or other data and made a range of recommendations about training,
operations, community engagement, and so on. The Baltimore Police
Department, for example, spent more than a quarter million dollars on a
“police department consulting service contract” to develop “a strategic plan
with goals and objectives for three and five years.”248
Adopting a broad conception of policing may mean more robust
regulation at three different points: the collection of data, the analysis of that
data, and the response to that analysis. It does not appear, however, that the
Constitution has sufficient regulatory reach. The constitution regulates

245
Scott Moxley, FBI Used Best Buy's Geek Squad to Increase Secret Public Surveillance, OC
WEEKLY, Mar. 8, 2017, http://www.ocweekly.com/news/fbi-used-best-buys-geek-squad-to-increasesecret-public-surveillance-7950030.
246
Responding to Crime in Real Time, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/wp-assets/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Impact-Study-LAPD.pdf.
247
Shane Harris, Palantir Technologies Spots Patterns to Solve Crimes and Track Terrorists, WIRED,
July 31, 2012, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/joining-the-dots.
248
Mark Reutter, Meet Baltimore's $560-an-hour Cop Consultant, BALT. BREW, Apr. 24, 2013,
https://baltimorebrew.com/2013/04/24/meet-baltimores-560-an-hour-cop-consultant/.

154

AM. J. CRIM. L.

[Vol. 44:2

private actors who engage in state action,249 but that happens most clearly
when a governmental agent explicitly directs the private actor’s course of
action. Sub-constitutional regulation may be necessary when the private actor
is simply selling information—which was not gathered explicitly or
exclusively for government purposes—to a public police agency. In the world
of meta-data and large-scale analytics of consumer information, the blurred
blue line serves as a reminder of the potential need to regulate information
and information services that are sold or provided to the police, especially
when the police are one of several potential buyers.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern policing is conceived of as the Thin Blue Line, a wall of police
officers who are all that stands between ordered, civilized society and the
anarchic, criminal element that constantly threatens it. But as evocative as
that dramatic imagery is, it inaccurately suggests that public officers are the
exclusive provider of policing services. That has never been the case.
Building on existing literature, this article explored the historical and
contemporary overlaps between public and private policing, demonstrating
that the Thin Blue Line is neither as thin nor as blue as it first appears. To
identify the nature of those overlaps, this article described four different
phenomena: private policing; semi-public private policing; semi-private,
public policing; and public policing. Each category abounds with everyday
behaviors that blur the line between public and private policing. From private
security guards initiating traffic stops in gated neighborhoods and patrolling
government buildings to privately created police forces, from off-duty police
officers working in uniform for private employers to the use of plainclothes
officers and police informants, modern policing efforts are best described as
“the blurred blue line.” The fact that such efforts are utterly ordinary only
strengthens the argument that the popular conception of policing requires
revision: the blurred blue line is not some exceptional aspect of contemporary
policing, it is contemporary policing.
This article explored some of the ways in which a broader conception of
policing, one that takes into account the blurred blue line, might affect the
process of police reform. A more holistic understanding of what policing is
can better inform conversations about what policing should be. In every
incarnation, reform efforts are directed at changing the nature of the police
community/relationship through a combination of incentives and
disincentives to change officer behavior and police culture. A broader
recognition of public and private policing can inform both the goals and
mechanisms, the ends and the means, of police reform. It can do so in at least
three ways. First, expanding the conventional understanding of policing to
include at least some aspects of both public and private policing offers a
potentially rich source of new information about how policing is performed
and the extent to which policing efforts may be considered successful.
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Second, a greater appreciation for the blurred blue line may lead us to
rethink the distribution of police resources in society. Consider that racially
disparate aspects of policing—including stops, arrests, and uses of force—are
often related to the relatively heavy police presence in poor, minority
communities. In short, the story goes, police just go where the crime is. That
may be true of public officers, but if we take into account private policing
efforts, the picture may change – defining police more broadly, we find that
there is a far heavier police presence in high-income communities than was
previously appreciated. That suggests that the racial discrepancy in police
activities may have less to do with police presence and the number of officercivilian interactions and more to do with the nature of policing and the quality
of those interactions. Taken seriously, the blurred line between public and
private policing may lead us to reconsider systemic problems, their
underlying causes, and promising solutions.
Third and finally, understanding the blurred blue line may also prove to
be an important consideration in how society regulates the practice of
policing. Effective regulation requires an accurate understanding of the
regulated activity; an incomplete understanding of policing can lead to
regulation that is focused exclusively on policing as it is conducted by public
officials not because the regulatory decision was driven by informed
consideration of how policing should be defined but instead because the
blurred blue line was not considered at all. From constitutional conundrums
such as the third-party doctrine to state workers compensation liability, the
blurred blue line brings into sharp focus a range of regulatory considerations
that are customarily overlooked.
This Article intentionally does not provide a normative determination
about the blurred blue line. My goal was not to establish that it is good or
bad; my goal was instead to establish that it is. Going beyond the
conventional understanding of policing will not simplify the process of police
reform. If anything, a more robust appreciation of the blurred blue line will
complicate something that is already complex. Yet this additional complexity
is necessary to fully understand policing so that lasting reform becomes
possible.

